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IN THE SUPREME CO'URT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
I•'HEJ~WAY

PARK BUILDING, INC.,
Plaint·iff and ResJHJ11deut,
vs.

WESTERN S'l A'l ES 'WHOLESALE
SUPPLY, BILL .J. POL'l1 ENO and
.TACK E. LORDS,
1

1

Defenda11ts

<111d

Case No.
11279

Ap1Jellants.

HESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMEN'r OF THE CASE
'rhis is an action by Plaintiff to collect rental on a
lease and for attachment of property to secure such
rentals. Defendants and Appellants counterclaim for
wrongful attachment and wrongful eviction claiming general and punitive damages.
DrnPOSITION OF THE CASI<~ BY LOWER COUR'J1
The Trial Court granted Judgment to Plaintiff for
ttn1mid rentals bnt determined that Plaintiff's attachlllrnt was wrongful and awarded nominal damagPs to
Dt.•fendants. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Motion to Strike 'l'<'stimony of Anticipated Damaw~
inadP afte1· the trial of tl11• issnes, w<'re grantPd and tlw
C'omt found that Plaintiff':-; attacl111wnt wa:-; not rnalie1u11" or witl1out prohahl1~ cau:-;e.

2

RELIEF' SOUGH'l1 ON APPEAL
Defendants and Respondents seek ren~rsal of tlw
.J udgnrnnt of the lower Court and ;judgment in their
favor as a matter of law or a retrial of the issues befor<'
a Jury.
Plaintiff seeks to sustain the judgment, or that failing, by way of cross assignment of error, requests judgment based on the record and as a matter of law with
regard to the following points:
1. Plaintiff did not wrongfully attach premise~
leased to Defendants nor evict them from such premises,
constructively or otherwise.

2. Even assuming wrongful attachment, Defendant~
are estopped from asserting such wrongful attachrnt>nt.
3. As Plaintiff is without fault herein, the lower
Court erred in awarding nominal damages against it and
in failing to award it attorney fees.

On February 18, 1965, Plaintiff, hereinaftPr called
].,reeway, leased certain premises to Defendants. Pursuant to this lease, Defendants prepaid th<' first and last
month's rental. (R. 3)
The premises were used to store inventory eonsi:-;ting of aluminum siding, steel siding, stone and almuinnn 1
roofing and composition roofing and as the headqnarkr~
for Defendants' wholesale and retail aluminum ::;i<ling
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business. (R. 142-146) The testimony of Defendant Jack
K Lords varied as to whether forty percent or eighty
percent of available warehouse space was so utilized.
(R. 143, 146)
rrhe payment for the period July 15 to August 15,
19GG ,,-as not made by Defendants and no payuwnt was

made thereafter. (R. 73)
On 8epternber 23, 1966, Freeway filed a Complaintseeking jnde,1111ent against Defendants for $1,044.00 rental due to and including Septeil1ber 15th, for adc!itional
rrnt, for attorney's fees, for a writ of attachment and
a writ of restitution. (R. 1-5)
An Affidavit was filed on September 23rd, a writ of
attachment was obtained from the Court, and a Praecipe
issued to the Sheriff of Salt Lake County instructing him
to attach all the personal property located on the premistis occupied by Defendants, to change the locks on said
premises, to remove all persons located therein, and to
tah physical possession thereof. (R. 5, 15, 16)
Pursuant to the Praecipe, the Sheriff attached the
personal property belonging to Defendants which was
in the leased premises on September 26, 1966. (R. lG, 73)
On September 30th, Freeway amended its Complaint
requesting additional rental, specifying attorney's fees,
and again requested a writ of attachment or alternatiyely,
a writ of restitution. (R. 8-10)
D<•f t>ndants furnished an undertaking as l'l'<-ftli n.J
IJ\ Hnl<· G-1: C(f) and a hearing was held by the Court
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on October 6, 1966, as which time Freeway'8 attacluut•nt
was dissolved and the bond of Defendants 8llb8titnte<l
therefor. (R. 7) Freeway's attachment \\'U8 discharged
by Order of the Court on October 7, 1966. (R. 17)
On October 6, 1966, a three day notice to }Jay rent
or terminate tenancy wa8 served pernonally upon Defendants and thereafter, on October 11th, Fret:•way wa~
allowed to again amend and base an additional claim on
unlawful detainer. ( R. 23, 27-32) Defendants thereafter
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the three day
notice was not served prior to the filing of the action,
which motion was denied by the Court on October 14,
1966. (R. 26, 37)
At the time of the dissolution of the attachment on
October 6, 1966, Freeway tendered the keys to premises
to Defendants who refused to accept them. (R. 113-114)
After the attachment, no effort was made by Dt'fendants to establish another office. (R. 182) No effort
was made to maintain telephone service even though thl'
majority of Defendants' businc~ss was condncted by
phone. (R. 182-184)
Defendants had decided to abandon the bnildiug
prior to October 6, 1966. (R. 1G7) However, Defendant
Jack E. Lords continued to operate '\Vestern States
Wholesale Supply after October 6, Wfifi until the present
time. (R. 130, 138)
Pursuant to a Motion for Production of Document:-;,
Defendants produced State and Federal Income reax lfrturns for Western States Wholesale Supply Company,
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which returns indicate that the Defrndant Company had
a net loss in the year 1965 of $281.11 and a net loss in
the year 19GG of $3,238.49. (R. 156) (Ex. P. 8, P. 9, P. 10,
P. 11, P. 12)
l)pfendants contend that as a n~sult of the Plaintiff's
attachment they lost the services of eighteen salesmen,
the profit from $15,780.00 in inventory and the loss of a
husiness doing a five months gross of $136,016.03 in
J%(), \\'ith an approximate net income for five months in
l9G6 of $14,973.72. (R. 56-59, 136)

In this regard the record reveals:
W <:'Stern States Wholesale Supply Com1mny also did
business under the name of West States Construction.
(R. 147) It maintained a different bank account for each
operation, but co-mingled funds from its ·wholesale and
retail operations. (R. 148)

Wes tern States had no money in the bank between
Augnst 1, 1966 and September 26, 1966. (R. 152, 236)
\Vestern States reported to the Federal Government
on J nne 14, 1967 that it did not have sufficient information to compute its 1966 income. (R. 158) However, the
income projection with which it seeks to establish lost
income for purposes of its counterclaim herein was prepared at the request of Plaintiff's counsel in 1966. (R.
15:l) (Dep. of Jack E. Lords, page 8-9); (R. 2Hi) This
pro,jedion was not based on ledger cards kept to detail
income. (R. 217)
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' Defendants' Accountant a<lmittPd that the income
statement relied on might not he 01w hm1dr<'d percent
correct. ( R. 202)
As of June 14, l9G7 the booh of ~Western Statt>s
Whole Supply Company were not postPd up to and including August, 1966. (R. 215)
The same income items were reportt>d differently to
the Internal Revenue Service than to the trial court
below. (R. 157, 160, 163, 164, 17G, 177, 213, 220, 231)
The 1966 tax return of Western States \\Thole Sn1Jply Company and the testimony of .Jack K Lords show
that the company had lost money prior to the attachment
herein. (R. 251)
-~-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING A WRONGFUL
ATTACHMENT AND THAT DEFENDANTS WERE
THEREBY WRONGFULLY EVICTED FROM THE
PREMISES IN QUESTION.

Defendants appear to accnse Freeway of forciblt·
entry solely because of the fact that a notice to quit was
served by Plaintiff after the cormneneement of this aetion. However, no entry was made, nor does Freeway
rely on the unlawful detainer statute herein. The only
entry made by the Plaintiff herein was pursuant to
Court Order authorizing a writ of attachment and
through the person of the Sheriff. r1 1he re<1niremPnt~
of forcible entry (i.e. absPnee of the legal o\\·ner, fon' 1'-
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t:>tPalth, frand, etc.) as 8et forth in the ca8e8 of Appellant8' Brief are not present in this case.
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the allegation of
Point I of Defendants' Brief to the contrary, the lower
Comt found Defendants and Appellants "entitled to a
jndgrnent that such attachment was wrongful and that
they wPre thereby wron,qf'ully evicted from the premises
described in Plaintiff's Complaint." (Emphasis added)
(R. 94).

Plaintiff assigns error to this finding of wrongful
attachment and resulting wrongful eviction.
On September 26, 1966, Plaintiff had a lien on the
personal property located on the premises occupied by
Defendants. This lien arose pursuant to Section 38-3-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides:
"Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall
have a lien for rent due upon all non-exempt
property of the lessee brought or kept upon the
leased premises so long as the lessee shall occupy
said premises and for thirty days thereafter."
The Plaintiff was entitled to an attachment of the
personal property on the said premises in aid of its lien.
~rction 38-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in
pertinent part:
"Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid
nn<l<:>r a lease ... the lessor may have the personal
property of the le8see which is upon the leased
premises, and suhect to such lien, attached without other ground for such attachment."

8
In order to attach personal pro1wrty, tlu-' attaching
party is required to take such property into his custody.
Jn this regard, Rule 64 C ( e) (3), Utah Rules of Ci,·iJ
Procedures, provides in part:
"rl1he office1· to whom the writ is directed must
execute the same without delay ... as follows:
(3) Personal property capable of manual
deliven• must be attached b,\· taking it into
custody ... "
A levy upon personality must be made by seiznn·
and a change of possession of the chattels from a debtor
to the attaching officer. This change of possession or a
taking into custody may be either actual or constructin>,
according to the nature of the property, and gem•rally
speaking, the custody and control should be such a~
to Pnable the officer to retain or assert his power so
that it cannot properly be withdrawn or taken Ii.'
another without his knowing it. It is essPntial to a
valid attachment that chattels be taken out of the control
of an attachment debtor. See Bryant v. Osgood, 52 N".H.
182; Page Seed Co. c. City Hardware Store, 96 N.H.
~1~9. 77 A 2d 35, 22 ALR 2d 1273.
The attaching officer must do more than place a
guard on the premises. 'Yhile this may constitute a dai1n
of dominion oYer the property, it does not neces~arily
earry with it the power to exercise that dominion M
it dotis not exclude owners from the building or ]ll'ewnt
tlH'lll from assuming the control and cart' oYer the prnpt'l't,\· and they art> not tlwrt>b,\· deprin•d of po:':'t'~!'iPIL
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75 lowa 471, 39 N.vY. 714. See
also, 7 CJ S, Attachment, Sec. 223.
~(·P Jlif;!Jard 1;. Zenor,

The general rule in this area is summarized in 6 Am .
•J ur. 2d, Attadnnent and Garnisl1111ent, Sec. 296, where
it i::; stated:
"As a general rule, a levy of an attachment
npon personal property is made by a seizure or
taking of possession or custody of the property,
either actual or constructive, and as far as practicable under the circumstances. Or, as it has been
expressed in many cases, the levying officer must
do some act for which he could be successfully
prosecuted as a trespasser if it were not for the
protection afforded him by the writ. A mere
paper levy is not in general sufficient unless a
statute makes it so.
"However, the above requirements do not
mean necessarily that the officer must actually
Jay his hands on the property or take it manually
into his possession, at least if he has taken custod)· or control thereof in some manner as by
tlu~ appointment of a keeper or by having the
property in his view and announcing the attachment. Nor need he remove the property in every
ease. In fact, the nature of the property may be
such as to make manual seizure impractical or
impossible, as in the case of cumbersome or bulky
articles, or a credit or chose in action in favor of
the defendant but not represented by a written
instrument."
While it is necessary that the attaching officer take
pos:sPssion or custody of property in order to have a
1 alid attachment it is not necessary that cumbersome or
'
.
.
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bulky property be removed from the premi~ws. See Page
Seed Co. v. City Hardu·ar<' Store, ~)() N.H. ~~59, 77 A 2d
35; Annotation 22 ALR 2d 1273.
rrhe general rule is t->ummarized in G Am. J ur. 2d,
.A. ttachment and Oarnit->hment, Sec. 298, wherein it j,,
stated:

"It is generally held that where the proJJerty
to be attached is of such a bulkv or cmnberso1m
nature that its seizure and r~moval would be
attended with great expense or difficulty, tJ1e
property need not be manually seized or removed;
it is sufficient if the acts of the officer are such
as to put the property out of the control of the
attachment debtor. Accordingly, it is not neces-

sary to remove frmn the place in which they at1'
fo1J;nd lrnlky articles difficult of removal, such m·
pile.s of lumber, bricks, or stones, although tl11
fact that such property is diffic1tlt of removal
does not exc'Use the failure of an officer to take
possession; it is nPvertheless incumbent on him

to do whatever may be necessary to take the property into legal cnstodr." (J£n11Jhasis Supplied)
Many cases have held that placing a new lock on
and locking the door of a store or business to attach the
personal property located therein, effectively places sai<l
property in the control and custody of an attaching officer and constitutes a valid attachment.

In the case of Pa_qe Seed Co. v. City Hardw1irc
Store, 96 N.H. 359, 77 A 2d 35, 22 ALR 2d 1288, the
sheriff attached all the chattels and pernonal property of

the Defendant located on the premises of the suhjt>d
hardware store by going to the premises on Christrna~
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Uay whil<• the store was dosed, placing a new clasp on
(•ach of tlH" three doors and locking each wjth a padlock.
The Court held that the sheriff had taken exclusive and
actual ctrntod.v and control of the ::mbject property, that
the attaehment was valid and that it was unnecessary for
the sheriff to physically remove the personalty from
the premises in order to place the same within his custody and control.
Similarly in the case of Florea 1.·. Sclrnltz, 128 Misc.
11, 217 NYS 704, the attaching officer le,·ied upon
goods jn a store by serving the debtor-lessee with a
1rrit of attachment, taking the keys and putting a new
lock on the door. The Court upheld the validity of the
attachment, stating:

''It is not necessary for an executing officer
to actually remove all property attached. He takes
possession of it. That is sufficient. Physical possession means taking hold of the property, exercising control over it."
lncll•ed, if the attaching officer does not in all catM'
]int C'hatkls in a building out of the control of the debtor,
the validity of his attachment is open to question. See
!Jry((Jzt c. Osgood, 52 N.H. 182; Page Seed Co. u. City
llordu·arc, Sitpra. So in the case of Safford i:. Morris
Metal Products Co., 99 Conn. 372, 121 A. 885, an attachn1ent was declared invalid because the attaching officer
''did not tell the superintendent or an>· other person what property he claimed under the attachnwnt ' and did not IJO~t anv
. notiee coneerning the
:-wil'.nn• of an.v pro1wrt~·, did not change an>· locks
or kt·ys, nor take, demand, or l'<'L!Uest any keys, or
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even inquire tonterning tlH· t>xistence of anv kPY,
or locks, and did not segregate or maintain ·att~al
physical possession of any property ... ".
Plaintiff submits that as the personal property
attached in the instant proceeding consisted of roofing,
siding and office equipment which wm; cumbersome and
bulky, the physical removal of \vhich would have bePu
inconvenient and expensive, that changing the lock8 un
the premises and locking the door of Plaintiff's warehouse was a proper way to affect an attachment on th!'
said personalty.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO SUBMIT THE QUESTIONS OF GENERAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY.

The Trial Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to StrikP
rrestimony of Anticipated Damages at the close of the
trial of the issues below. This Motion was bast,'{} uµun
the speculative and uncertain nature of these damage~
and the fact that Appellants' business was new and had
not shown profit.
As a general rule, evidence of expected profits frorn
a new business is too speculative, uncertain and remotf'
to be considered, and does not meet the legal standard
of reasonable certaint~·. 22 Arn. Jnr. 2d, Damages, R\'c
173.
Recovery for lost profits is not generally allo\\"t'il
for injury to a new business ·with no hi::story of profifr
Q
·1ii
See Taylor v. Shoemaker, 34 Ala. App. l 68 , 38 -~o. 895.

13
The case of New Amsterdam Casualty Company v.
Ctility Battery Manufactitring Company, 122 Fla. 718,
J(j(j So. S5G, is pertinent. In that case, an action for
anticipated profits of a commercial business was founded
11pon [ffOJJer testimony of a decrease in gross business
and of estimated future profits. The claimant operated
its business for a period of more than three months prior
to tl1P acts claimed to have interferred with its right to
do business, but it did not appear from the record or the
('Yidence that it had ever made a profit on such business.
The Florida Court held that where there ·was no
im>of that the hn:::;iness had been profitable prior to the
ad complained of, it was error to admit evidence of a
decrease in gross business or evidence of estimated futnre profits.
The rule m this state was set forth by the Utah
Suprenw Court in Jenkins L'. Morgan, 123 Utah -±SO,
~()() P.2d 532, as follows:
"Before special damages for loss of profits
to a general business occasioned by the wrongful
acts of another may be recovered, it must be
made to appear that the business had been in
snecessfnl operation for such a period of time
as to give it permanency and recognition, and that
such uiJJsiness was earning a profit which could uc
reasonably ascertained and appro;;rimated." (Em-

lJhasis Supplied.) 123 Utah 487.

the income tax retnrn8 which were produced
l)pfondant:::; and thP evidence herein indicates that
1
D"i'P1Hlant, We8tern State:::; Whole8ale Supply, had no
Sine<~

1J\
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history of profit, Plaintiff ~mbrniti:; that it ii:; improlJt·r
to admit any evidence regarding anticipated profits for
the year 1966 under the theor~' that i:;uch evidence doe'
not meet the legal standard of certainty and is i:;pecula
tive.
With regard to punitive damagei:;, it is necessary
to plead and prove that a writ and levy of attaclnnrnt
have been issued without carnse or \vithout probablP
cause in order to obtain punitive damages for wrongful
attachment. See Cahoon v. Ho,qglm, 31 Ut. 74, 8G Pae.
963; 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment, Sec. 597.
The giving of a bond which dis::;olves the attachment
and has the effect of preventing a determination of it1
regularity, precludes an action for wrongful attachment.
See Rachelman v. Skinner, 46 Minn. 196, 48 NvV 776.
Where probable cause is an element of an action for
wrongful attachment, the ::;howing of probable cam;e i~
a defense and if Plaintiff had probable cause to issue
the writ in this case, Defendants must fail in their clai111
for wrongful attachment. See G Am. Jur. 2d Attachment.
Sec. 617; Cahoon'&. Hoggan, Supra.
Defendants below admitted liability for unpaid ren·
tal at the time of the commencement of this action. SPe
38-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part:
''Whenever any rent shall bP due and nnpaid
under a lease ... theLessor may have tlw personal
property of the Les::;ep which i::-; upon the h-'a~l·il
premise::;, and ::mbject to ::;uch lit•n, attached w1tl 1
out other ground for ::;uch attachment.''
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Plaintiff submits that prouahl<' eause for the attachnwnt Jwrein exists.

POINT III
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO AS SE RT
WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT.

Where a Defendant gives a bond, eonditional to perl'orm the J ndgment which operates to discharge the
attachment and makes the bond obligors unconditionally
liable, such action renders immaterial the validity or even
tlH' grounds upon which the attachment was based. Bee
7 C.J.S., Sec. 313, Attachment.
The validity of such an attachment is thereafter
immaterial. First National Bank 11. McKean, (CCA Ore.)
:285 Fed. 557.
l111e attached party is thereafter estopped to deny
Uw truth or sufficiency of the grounds upon which the
\\'rit of attachment was issued or the regularity of the
prneeedings. 7 CJS Attachment, Sec. 313 (see note 81
therein and 13 Jurisdictions cited in support thereof) ;
sPe also Mid-Continent Engineering Company u. Arrow
f'etrolcwn Corporation, 45 Fed. Supp. 1000.
'L1he election to dissolve a writ of attachment estops
a DPfondant to claim that it was wrongful. Fidelity and
f!1'l)(Jsil Co111pa11y of Maryla11rl 11• Cou/J, :213 Krntnek:·,
t()/, :281 SvV 478.
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POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING NO MIN AL DAMAGES AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND IN
FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS
FEES.

Because the lower Court found that Plaintiff had
wrongfully attached the property of Defendants, it both
awarded nominal damages against the Plaintiff and refused to allow Plaintiff its attorneys foes provided under
the lease.
It is submitted that should this Court find that
Plaintiff and Respondent did not wrongfully attach property of the Defendants that the nominal damages should
be disallo\ved and the case n·manded with instrnctiont-1 to
modify the judgment so as to award a reasonable attorneys fee to the Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court shonld
sustain the judgment of the lower court and find, in
addition, that it did not wrongfully attach the premise1
leased to Defendants herein nor wrongfully evict theJll
from such premises, either constructively or otherwisr.
Even if the elements of wrongful attachment are pre~
ent, Defendants are estopped as a matter of law fro1n
asserting such wrongful attachment. This Court shonld
hold accordingly.

Respectfully submitted,
BETTILYON & HOWARD
F. Burton Howard
333 South Seeond East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

